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New Laws For CIA Opposed

No Need for Senate To Confirm Inspector, Webster Tells Panel

By Bob Woodward
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

CIA Director William H. Webster said yesterday in a closed hearing of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence that the Reagan administration opposes new legislation for the Central Intelligence Agency in the wake of the Iran-contra affair, according to two informed sources.

Webster told the committee that he sees no need for legislation that would require Senate confirmation of appointees to the post of CIA inspector general, the key recommendation for changing CIA management in the final congressional Iran-contra report released Wednesday.

The Iran-contra report said the inspector general, who reviews allegations of misdeeds by agency personnel, "appears not to have had the manpower, resources or tenacity to acquire key facts uncovered by the other investigations."

But Webster told the committee that such legislation is unnecessary because his internal review would result in needed personnel and policy changes. He promised to strengthen the inspector general's stature, but said he first wanted to review the conclusions of Washington lawyer Russell Bruemmer, who is doing a report on CIA's role in the Iran-contra affair.

Bruemmer, whose report is expected to be completed in four or five weeks, was an assistant to Webster when Webster headed the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

During yesterday's hearing, Webster also reiterated the Reagan administration's opposition to legislation introduced in the Senate and House that would mandate, without exception, that any new covert actions be reported to the congressional intelligence committees at least within 48 hours after initiation. The Iran-contra report also endorsed this approach.

President Reagan said in a letter Aug. 7 that he would notify Congress of covert activities within 48 hours "in all but the most exceptional circumstances." Key members of the Senate and House intelligence committees have criticized the president's position.

The question of notification was a central issue in the Iran-contra affair because the Iran arms sales were carried out as part of a covert action finding that was not reported to Congress for at least 10 months last year.

Yesterday's closed hearing dealt exclusively with legislative matters that are unclassified, the kind of testimony usually made in a public session, the sources said. One senator on the committee said yesterday that "too much goes on covertly and in closed hearings. It shouldn't. No one had thought about it."

A CIA spokesman declined comment, saying the committee had to release any information. A committee spokesman, David Holliday, said the CIA could release Webster's prepared remarks if it wanted to.

The congressional Iran-contra report recommended that new laws be passed requiring that both the inspector general and the CIA general counsel be confirmed by the Senate. Senate confirmation would give the two key officials more independence and more control over their investigations.

The Iran-contra congressional committees found that CIA field operatives repeatedly lied to the CIA inspector general during his various inquiries into allegations that the agency secretly assisted the Nicaraguan contras. A number of sources said that the inspector general is considered a pawn of senior CIA management and held in low esteem.

Webster told the committee yesterday that when he took over as FBI director in 1977 he was able to handle problems of misconduct internally and believed he could do the same at the CIA. He became CIA director on May 26, succeeding the late William J. Casey.

In recent years, the CIA inspec-

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CIA's Webster Opposes New Check on Agency

tor general position has not had the status it did 25 years ago, according to agency veterans. There have been four inspectors general since 1981, when Casey became director and Reagan took office.


Congressional investigators cited two examples where the inspector general's office failed to uncover key facts. In 1986, allegations surfaced that CIA officers based at a contra camp in Honduras arranged a resupply of arms to the contras using CIA helicopters, an activity prohibited by U.S. law.

In early 1987, these officers lied to committee investigators when questioned about their operations, according to congressional sources. In April, however, at about the same time that the congressional investigators were able to prove the helicopter flights had taken place, the CIA's inspector general informed the committees that one of the individuals involved had come forward and confessed, the sources said.

The inspector general, however, did his inquiry and his report was made available to the committees.

"He determined that it was a case of boys-will-be-boys," one congressional source said, characterizing the report as finding that delivering arms to the contras "was only violating regulations ... can't be proven as a violation of laws because there was no criminal intent, and besides, we want energetic people that take initiatives."

The second example came after a cargo plane carrying arms to the contras was shot down over Nicaragua on Oct. 5, 1986. The CIA's



WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
... sees no need for CIA legislation.

inspector general opened an inquiry after the agency was linked to the flight by material at the site and comments by Eugene Hasenfus, only surviving crew member.

CIA officials, including Thomas Castillo, the agency's station chief in Costa Rica, lied to the inspector general about his role when questioned as part of the investigation. He also told a false story to the Senate intelligence committee.

Castillo changed his story—admitting that he aided the resupply network—after the staff of the Tower review board confronted him with records maintained by former National Security Council aide Marine Lt. Col Oliver L. North. The documents identified Castillo as part of the team that assisted the Hasenfus plane.

The CIA inspector general then had to reopen his inquiry into agency Central American covert operations. The CIA's acting director, Robert M. Gates, took the unusual step of saying that those who had lied earlier could come forward to tell the truth.

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Iran Panels Minimized FBI, CIA Role

Top Officials Weren't Questioned in Detail

By Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writer


Despite new evidence presented in their final report of questionable CIA and FBI involvement in the Iran-contra affair, the congressional panels investigating the scandal decided not to make a major issue of the activities and declined to subject senior officials of either agency to detailed questioning.

Committee leaders had tentatively planned to call as public witnesses Central Intelligence Agency Director William H. Webster, who headed the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the Iran-contra affair, and Deputy CIA Director Robert M. Gates, No. 2 man during most of 1986 under the late Director William J. Casey. But neither appeared.


Webster was never even deposed by the committees, according to committee sources, although he and his agents played a key role last year in the initial investigation of the secret Iran arms sales and were linked to former White House aide Lt. Col. Oliver L. North in other earlier activities involving U.S. military support for the Nicaraguan contras at a time when such support was barred by Congress.

Gates was deposed for only two hours by the committee staff and "trumpeted his lack of knowledge" of the Iran-contra affair, according to one committee investigator who was present. Gates had earlier appeared before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence during its preliminary inquiry last December into the scandal and testified before the Tower review board early this year.

One source of pressure for special treatment for the two agencies and their bosses came from Senate and House intelligence committee members—particularly Senate Chairman David L. Boren (D-Okla.)—who wanted any detailed



WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
... was never deposed



ROBERT M. GATES
... "trumpeted his lack of knowledge"

inquiry to be limited their own panels, according to sources who asked not to be identified.

Boren openly argued against calling Gates in public and later raised questions about the approach taken by committee lawyers in Gates' closed-door deposition, according to committee sources. Boren supported Gates in his unsuccessful effort to be CIA director and has said he expects Gates to remain as No. 2 under Webster.

Boren has said that Gates had already been questioned at length about his role in the Iran-contra affair.

"There also was not time to go into what some members felt were peripheral issues" involving FBI and CIA performance, one top investigator said.

However, a special chapter in the committees' report discusses alleged National Security Council staff interventions in criminal prosecutions, including several incidents involving North and FBI officials, but never mentions Webster.

The report also has a chapter describing privately funded covert operations, including one in 1985 and 1986 to ransom U.S. hostages using personnel from the Drug Enforcement Administration, under North's direction, financed in part by money from Texas billionaire H. Ross Perot. Webster was aware of the operation, according to committee sources. The Iran-contra report said these efforts may have violated U.S. laws.

Evidence available to the committees showed that Webster also was aware of an operation in mid-1985 involving both the FBI and CIA that used \$100,000 from Perot in another unsuccessful plan to pay ransom for a U.S. hostage.

Webster's only meeting with Iran-contra committee staff occurred in an interview arranged primarily to get assurances that the FBI would continue to supply information even though Webster was moving to the CIA.

Webster appeared twice before the Senate intelligence committee in connection with his nomination as CIA director, promising to disclose all the FBI contacts with North. However, additional information on North's contacts with the bureau continued to appear well after Webster was confirmed by the Senate and took his new job.

The majority report disclosed that CIA officials were far more knowledgeable about the Iran arms sales than previously revealed. Newly disclosed documents described in the report show that some CIA operatives heard as early as spring 1986 that a diversion of profits to the contras was being openly discussed by North and Iranian middleman Manucher Ghorbanifar.

Iran Panels Minimized CIA, FBI Role

These findings raise questions about the assurances Gates gave during his congressional appearances that he had no hints of a diversion until CIA official Charles Allen came to him in October 1986. At that time, Gates said later in testimony before the Tower board and Senate intelligence panel, the information Allen had was only speculative and "shaky stuff."

Gates also told the Tower review board that "when he first heard Allen's suspicions that a diversion of funds had taken place, his first reaction was to tell Mr. Allen that I didn't want to hear any more about it," according to the Iran-contra report.

The Iran-contra report reveals that Allen, the CIA's top intelligence officer for counterterrorism, interviewed Ghorbanifar in January 1986 and recorded in his notes that the arms sales "could be used for 'Ollie's boys in Central America.'"

Allen also noted that the arms sales "can fund contras," the report said. In his deposition to the com-

mittees, Allen said he did not include that information in his memo to Casey and others because he "did not consider it important or even relevant to my particular mission," the report said.

George Cave, a CIA retiree who was brought back under contract to work on the Iran arms sales operation, reported to Casey and others in early March that Ghorbanifar had brought up the contra diversion idea at a meeting in Paris at which North was also present.

Ghorbanifar "also proposed that we use profits from these deals and others to fund [other operations]. We could do the same with Nicaragua," the Cave memo to Casey said, according to the committees' report.

The Allen notes and Cave memo were not brought up during the staff deposition of Gates, according to sources.

Allen and Cave, according to the Iran-contra committee investigators, said they forgot about Ghorbanifar's earlier statements on diversions.

In an unusual addendum to the report, the two top members of the Senate intelligence committee, Boren and Vice Chairman William S. Cohen (R-Maine), alleged that agency personnel involved in Central America violated CIA "policy and restrictions imposed by law."

They also criticized CIA officials for failing to give adequate "direction and supervision," and accused others for withholding information from Congress after the Iran-contra affair became public.

At the same time, Boren and Cohen argued successfully inside the Senate committee that the Iran-contra report should not focus on CIA personnel or activities.

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WASHINGTON POST

Director Webster Says He Plans To Keep Gates as Deputy at CIA

Other Staff Decisions Await Review of Agency's Iran-Contra Report

By Bob Woodward
and Walter Pincus
Washington Post Staff Writers

CIA Director William H. Webster said yesterday he intends to retain Robert M. Gates as deputy director of the agency, though he will wait two to three weeks to make any other personnel decisions, taking time to review an internal report on the agency's involvement in the Iran-contra scandal.

Asked yesterday in an interview at The Washington Post whether Gates will keep his post, Webster said, "I certainly hope so. Nothing has been presented to me at the present time that would make me think other than that."

Gates, a career CIA official, was named to the No. 2 CIA post in early 1986 by William J. Casey. President Reagan nominated Gates to succeed Casey as director last February. But Gates withdrew his name after questions were raised during Senate confirmation hearings about his activities during the Iran-contra affair.


Webster spoke highly of Gates and said, "I think Bob and I see eye to eye on the major things." The director said any actions he might take regarding the other half dozen CIA officials involved in the Iran-contra affair should "be fair and not be precipitous."

The congressional Iran-contra report released last week disclosed new details about the involvement of agency personnel in secret military aid to the Nicaraguan contras at a time when it was barred by law.

The congressional report also disclosed that Gates and a handful of CIA officials received information about the possibility of diversion of funds from the Iran arms sales to the contras months before it was made public.



WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
... sees "eye to eye" with Gates



ROBERT M. GATES
... actions during scandal questioned

Key members of the House and Senate intelligence committees have pressed Webster to deal with the agency personnel who not only were involved in the Iran-contra affair but lied to the agency's inspector general about their actions and presented misleading and sometimes conflicting testimony about their actions to Congress.

Webster said that in his six months as head of the Central Intelligence Agency he has intentionally moved slowly in dealing with the aftermath of the Iran-contra affair.

"Those inside the agency and those outside should know that whatever I do was not done precipitously," he said. "I may be wrong, and people may disagree with the conclusions I reach. They will not be able to say he rushed in without knowing, that he just cowed to outside pressures, whether the press

Webster indicated that he will make a formal report to Congress on his actions, but it was not clear what report, if any, would be made public. The report Webster will rely on is being drafted by Russell Bruemmer, a Washington attorney who was a special assistant to Webster when the CIA director ran the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Of the Iran-contra affair, Webster said, "A lot of things have come out of this investigation that are healthy." He said solutions to the problems have largely been put in place through executive order, adding that he does not see a need for new legislation.

The congressional Iran-contra report recommended that Senate confirmation be required for the post of CIA inspector general. Though Webster said "there were clearly some problems in the overall inspection efforts" during the Iran-contra affair when some CIA officials "did not tell the truth," he said he will enhance the status and caliber of people in the office to ensure thorough internal policing.

"Lying is inexcusable," he said.

He said he opposes legislation introduced in the Senate and House that would mandate, without exception, 48-hour notification to Congress of the start of the most sensitive covert actions.

The CIA now does this, he said, but added that he could foresee a covert action involving danger to lives that would require withholding notification to the intelligence committees for a matter of days.

"I am still unpersuaded that Casey wanted an off-the-shelf, stand-alone method of ignoring all the laws and procedures," Webster said, referring to the congressional testimony of Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L. North that Casey envisioned such an "off-the-books" covert-action capability outside the CIA.

Referring to reports that Casey undertook such unauthorized operations with Saudi Arabia, Webster said, "I don't know the answer to that. That's still a puzzle."

The Iran-contra report raised the possibility that Gates had been told as early as August 1986 of the possible diversion of Iranian arms sales profits to aid the contras. Richard

Kerr, who had succeeded Gates as deputy for intelligence, told the congressional committees that he forwarded speculation about a diversion from another CIA official to Gates at the end of August.

But, according to the congressional report, "Gates told the CIA inspector general that he could not recall" being apprised of these speculations.

The report also cited Gates' 1986 testimony about the willingness of agency officials to avoid learning about the funding of the Nicaraguan contras. He said that during the period Congress had banned direct U.S. aid to the Nicaraguan contras, "agency people . . . from the director on down, actively shunned information. We didn't want to know how the contras were being funded We actively discouraged people from telling us things. We did not pursue lines of questioning."

The Iran-contra majority report said that "this turned upside down the CIA's mission to collect all intelligence relevant to national security."

Yesterday Webster said that Gates had been worried "in terms of dealing with the private [donors to the contras] . . . that too much involvement with them in order to find out any information about them might put [the CIA] too close and across legal ground."

"That's what I believe he meant," Webster said, interpreting Gates' testimony. "Knowing Bob Gates, I have a lot of confidence that he does not belong to a school of 'See No Evil.'"

A number of well-placed sources said recently that Webster has come to rely heavily on Gates, who runs day-to-day operations.

Sen. David L. Boren (D-Okla.), chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said in an interview this month, "Gates is as influential a No. 2 as there is in any agency in town."

24 November 1987

WASHINGTON POST

Reagan Bars Question of Iran Pardons

Aides Seek to Dispel Rumors of Plan to Excuse Scandal's Key Figures

By George Lardner Jr.
and Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writers

President Reagan refused yesterday to discuss the possibility of presidential pardons for those facing indictment in the Iran-contra affair, but aides and friends flatly discounted rumors that such a step might be imminent.

Asked about the prospect of pardons during a photo session in the Rose Garden, Reagan said, "That's a question no one can answer."

To reporters who replied that surely he could answer it, Reagan insisted, "No, I can't."


The president was in the Rose Garden for the annual presentation of the White House Thanksgiving turkey. "I'll pardon him," Reagan said when asked about the turkey's fate.

Reagan made plain yesterday that he did not think much of the congressional report that accused him of "failing to take care that the law reigned supreme."

"Maybe they labored and brought forth a mouse," Reagan said.

White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, meanwhile, rejected the idea of Thanksgiving pardons for former National Security Council aide Oliver L. North, former national security adviser John M. Poindexter and, possibly, former national security adviser Robert C. McFarlane as "a media phenomenon."

The New York Times committed the notion to print yesterday morning in a report saying that "there is a hot, widely discussed, wholly unconfirmed rumor that President Reagan will issue the pardons on Thursday, citing the Thanksgiving Day holiday as a time for forgiveness and healing."



LAWRENCE E. WALSH
... indictments in January or later

"We don't discuss pardons, period," Fitzwater said. He said any comment "just lends credence to idle speculation and ill-founded rumors."

The only unknown seems to be what Reagan might do next year, once the November elections are over and he is preparing to leave office.

Friends of the president say he has kept his own counsel about this, neither bringing up the subject of pardons nor being asked about it.

"This is a subject I have not and will not discuss at this time," Reagan said at a Cabinet Room meeting with business leaders following his Rose Garden appearance.

Asked when he would talk about

it, he said, "Sometime in the future."

For the moment, Reagan is said to be mindful of how harmful pardons could be to the domestic and foreign policy goals he still wishes to attain.

Reagan will leave the capital this morning for his ranch in California, spend the holiday there and return on Sunday. "I don't expect any significant news on this trip, and I would send out skeleton crews to cover it," Fitzwater said.

Independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh is still busy conducting his criminal investigation of the Iran-contra affair, and indictments are not expected until January at the earliest.

Attorney General Edwin Meese III appeared before Walsh's Iran-contra grand jury yesterday for the fourth time this month. It was not known whether he would have to return again.

Meese, who has said he was appearing as a witness, not a target, was sharply criticized in the final report of the congressional Iran-contra committees last week, especially because of what the committees described as a slipshod fact-finding inquiry that Meese conducted at the White House Nov. 21-25 while North and others destroyed crucial documents.

Reagan has been quoted as having opposed pardons when the question came up last December, on the grounds that it would signify that he believed crimes had been committed.

Even if indictments are forthcoming, sources point out, it is far from clear that Walsh will be able to steer them past the stiff pretrial skirmishing that lies ahead.

Staff writer David Hoffman contributed to this report.

20 November 1987

WALL STREET JOURNAL

North Mulled Bounty Offer, Report Shows

Bonus Scheme for Capture Of Sandinista Officers Was Never Carried Out

By DAVID ROGERS
And EDWARD T. POUND

Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
WASHINGTON—The House-Senate report on the Iran-Contra affair discloses that Marine Lt. Col. Oliver North considered using profits from arms sales to Iran to pay a bounty on Sandinista or Cuban officers captured in Nicaragua.

The report offers no evidence that Col. North ever carried out his bounty idea, but notebooks kept by the former White House aide show he considered the payments last year even after the Central Intelligence Agency had resumed U.S. military aid to the insurgents.

Separately, citing classified material provided by the Israeli government, the report says that an Israeli middleman claims to have made as much as \$700,000 in payments to Iranian contacts. The report also says that on different occasions middlemen set aside as much as \$7 million for such payments.

The Israeli data and Col. North's notebooks are two of the richest veins of new material congressional investigators tapped in writing the massive report released this week. They also reviewed previously undisclosed memos and tape recordings by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the 690-page text of their report is laden with footnotes providing further detail of the often free-wheeling arms network run from the White House.

"Bounty for Sandinista or Cuban officers" reads an October 1986 notation in Col. North's notebooks. It indicates \$5,000 would be paid to any Contra commander or soldier who captured an enemy officer. And, the notebook says the Contra army command would receive \$200,000 "for each 5" enemy officers captured.

Secord's Involvement

An April 1984 notation by Col. North indicates that his close ally, retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, may have been involved in an earlier covert operation separate from the Iran-Contra affair.

A veteran of special operations, Gen. Secord had left the government a year earlier. But in reference to an apparent covert arms transfer in 1984, long before the first shipment of U.S. arms to Iran, Col. North's notes read, "Can't produce \$; similar to Secord arrangement; 65 lift vans; \$750K."

Other notes made by the colonel in 1986, and CIA records, indicate that it was only the Iranians' failure to come up with more money that prevented the U.S. from selling Tehran even more arms than were shipped. One proposed sale that never came to fruition involved two U.S. radar units that Iran purchased during the Shah's regime but were being held at a Pennsylvania warehouse pending negotiations between the U.S. and Iran.

Failed Radar Sale

The State Department supposedly had control of the equipment. But the deputy chief of the CIA's Near East division said that the agency worked through the Defense Department to obtain permission for the purchase without the State Department knowing that the equipment was intended for Iran. The idea was to resell the radar units to Iran at a profit.

"DOD's price for the radar units, accurately noted in North's notes, was approximately \$6.3 million," reads the congressional report. "However, since Iranian funding for the radars failed to materialize, the Enterprise (run by Col. North and Gen. Secord) missed an opportunity for a second \$18 million profit."

The report shows that top CIA officers were receiving reports that made it clear large profits were being generated by the U.S. arms sales. It also says a senior CIA official's office became "the command post for coordinating" a secret 1985 shipment of Hawk anti-aircraft missiles from Israel to Iran.

The official, Duane "Dewey" Clarridge, then head of the CIA's European operations and now chief of its Counterterrorism Center, denied under oath that he knew the shipment contained missiles. But the committees said they were "troubled" by the fact that two cables disclosing the contents of the shipment were "inexplicably missing from an otherwise intact set of 78 cables sent by CIA officials during the operation."

The new disclosures come as the Senate begins hearings on proposed legislation to tighten control of covert operations. But in testimony prepared for a closed-door hearing of the Senate Intelligence Committee today, CIA Director William Webster will ask Congress to delay passing any new laws until he has time to make changes of his own at the agency.

Mr. Webster's special counsel investigating the agency's recent performance, Russell Bruemmer, is expected to make his recommendations within a few weeks. Mr. Webster then is expected to announce some shifts in top CIA personnel. Clair George, the CIA's top covert operations officer, has told friends he'll retire at year end. Mr. Webster is said to be considering several possible successors including Ted Price, the head of the CIA personnel office; Theodore Gries, a former officer in Asia and now the CIA's liaison to Congress; counterintelligence chief Gus Hath-

away; and veteran operations officer Charles Cogan.

Since the Iran-Contra scandal erupted a year ago, congressional and criminal investigators have suspected that some of the money generated by the Iranian arms sales ended up in the pockets of Iranian officials. A financial chronology provided to the committees by the Israeli government appears to confirm that substantial sums were paid to several Iranians involved in some arms transactions.

According to the congressional report, Tel Aviv disclosed that Iranian arms merchant Manucher Ghorbanifar had an Israeli middleman set aside \$5 million for "payments to certain Iranians." The report says that the money came from a \$24.7 million payment that Mr. Ghorbanifar received from Iran in 1985 for the 80 U.S.-made Hawk missiles. The arms deal fell through and, the report said, most of the \$5 million was returned to Mr. Ghorbanifar by the Israeli intermediary. The intermediary, who wasn't identified, told Israeli authorities, however, that around the same time he made \$700,000 in payments to various Iranians.

Hakim's Account

The congressional report also provides details on a separate \$2 million account that was set up in Switzerland and intended to benefit high-ranking Iranians. It was controlled by by Iranian-American businessman Albert Hakim, a key middleman used by the White House in the Iran-Contra operation. The \$2 million was to be paid to Iranians associated with a relative of Iranian Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani, according to Mr. Hakim's testimony before the committees.

Those payments weren't made, however. After the Iran-Contra scandal erupted, Swiss accounts controlled by Mr. Hakim were frozen by the Swiss government at the request of the U.S. As recently as last May, Mr. Hakim, in a private deposition given to the committees, maintained that monetary "obligations" were still due to Iranian contacts involved in the initiative.

Federal law-enforcement officials said that independent counsel Lawrence Walsh has been looking into whether Mr. Rafsanjani or members of his family received any money from arms transactions. But the issue isn't a major element of his investigation of the Iran-Contra operation.

The congressional report provides little new information on Israel's role in the Iran-Contra affair. Some members of the panels have complained that the investigation of Israel's role wasn't aggressive enough. The committees didn't interview Israeli officials or middlemen involved in the Iran-Contra affair. Instead, they relied on chronologies provided by the U.S. ally.

Col. North's extensive notes are an invaluable record of the affair, but the committees remain uncertain about how much weight to give his account of events. The Marine officer told the committees in a closed-door session last summer that Panamanian Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega offered to conduct sabotage operations against Nicaragua, using funds from the Iran arms sales. But investigators are divided about how seriously to treat the pro-